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I. Introduction 
THIS HAS BEEN AN ACTIVE YEAR in the area of housing and community 
development, with many of the recent changes oriented toward 
coping with a fluctuating housing finance market or assessing the 
effect of increased governmental activity in many sectors upon 
private rights and causes of action. The first section by the mem-
bers of the Committee on Housing and Community Development 
focuses upon recent changes in federal regulations dealing with 
the private sector, more specifically the fundamental change in en-
forcement of "due-on-sale" clauses. The second section in this arti-
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de examines new policies relating to transfers of the ownership of 
housing projects encumbered by mortgage loans insured or held by 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The 
third section analyzes a new trend in the eminent domain powers of 
community redevelopment agencies: the ability to choose between 
competing proposals of owner participants notwithstanding one 
owner's right to participation. The final section briefly reports on 
the progress of the Governmental Leasing Act of 1983 in the House 
and Senate. 
II. Federal Preemption of State Due-on-Sale 
Clause Prohibitions 
Prior to the enactment of the Garn-St. Germain Depository In-
stitutions Act of 1982, 1 no uniform federal policy governed the use 
of due-on-sale clauses2 by federally chartered or nonfederally 
chartered lenders. The courts in several states had declared that 
the due-on-sale clauses were invalid as restraints on the free aliena-
tion of real property, unless the creditor could demonstrate a need 
to protect its security interest from impairment. 3 Existing regula-
tions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) provided 
that federally chartered associations and savings banks could exer-
cise due-on-sale clauses notwithstanding restrictive state laws, 4 but 
no uniform judicial policy construed such authority with respect to 
other federal financial institutions or nonfederal lenders. 
1. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1701j-3(a)-1701j-3(g) (1982) [hereinafter cited as Act). 
2. A due-on-sale clause, as defined in the final codification of the Act, is: 
[A] contract provision which authoritc::s a iender, at its option, to declare due 
and payable sums secured by the lender's security instrument if all or any part of 
the property, or an interest therein, securing the real property loan is sold or 
transferred without the lender's prior written consent. 
Act §341 (a) (1), 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a) (1) (1982). 
While the purpose of a due-on-sale clause appears to be to prevent a borrower 
from disposing of the equitable or legal interest in the property without the 
lender's written consent, the due-on-sale clause has been used most recently to 
protect the economic security of lenders adversely affected by their commitment 
to fixed-rate, long-term loans in a period of rising interest rates. See Enforcement 
of Due-on-Transfer Clauses, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 891, 893, 895-96 
(1978). 
3. See, e.g., Wellenkampv. Bank of America, 21Cal.3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 
Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). 
4. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1983) expressly affirmed this right, and 12 C.F.R. 
§ 545.8-3(g) (1983) set out four situations in which a federal association could not 
exercise a due-on-sale clause. 
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The Act established a statutory preemption of state laws regard-
ing due-on-sale clauses for all lenders. The Act defined a "lender" 
as a person, a government agency or any assignee making a "real 
property loan," which it in turn defined as a loan, mortgage, 
advance, or credit sale secured by a lien on real property, the stock 
allocated to a dwelling unit in a cooperative housing corporation, 
or a residential manufactured home, whether real or personal 
property .5 Subject to specific limitations, the act authorizes lenders 
in any state, territory or the District of Columbia, at their option, 
to fully enforce a due-on-sale clause. 6 
One such limitation, applying to real property loans originated 
in a state by lenders other than federal savings and loan associa-
tions and federal savings banks, created a "window period" excep-
tion. The Act defined a window period as extending from the date 
of a restrictive state due-on-sale law or state Supreme Court deci-
sion to October 15, 1982. Federal preemption would apply to 
qualifying loans made during the window period only upon a 
transfer of the security occurring after October 15, 1985. 7 
However, if a state legislature (for loans originated by state-
chartered lenders), the Comptroller of the Currency (for loans 
originated by national banks) or the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration Board (for loans originated by federal credit unions) 
took action to regulate window-period loans and/or extend the 
window period with respect to such loans, the regulation would 
control.8 
Other limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses included 
prohibitions on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses pursuant to 
specified transfers or dispositions, including: 
(1) creation of a lien or other secondary encumbrance (e.g., secondary financ-
ing) not relating to a transfer of occupancy in the property; 
(2) other non-occupancy transfer actions, including transfers into inter vivos 
trusts in which the borrower remains a beneficiary, transfers resulting from a 
5. Act§§ 341(a) (2), (a) (3), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701j-3(a) (2), (a) (3) (1982). 
6. Act §§ 341(b) (1), (b) (2), 12 U.S.C. §§ 170lj-3(b) (1), (b) (2) (1982). 
Lenders are encouraged, however, to permit assumption of real property loans at 
the existing rate or at a "blended rate" (a rate at or below the average of the 
contract and market interest rates). Act§ 34l(b) (3), 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b) (3) 
(1982). 
7. Act§ 341(c) (1), 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c) (1) (1982). Following the passage of 
the Act, the National Credit Union Administration Board issued regulations 
regarding loans originated by federal credit unions and preempted state law 
applicable to such loans in cases of transfers made after November 18, 1982. 12 
C.F.R. § 701.21-2(b) (1983). 
8. Act§ 341(c) (1), 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c) (1) (1982). 
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separation or dissolution of marriage by which the borrower's spouse assumes 
ownership of the property, and transfers where the borrower's spouse or 
children assume ownership of the property; 
(3) involuntary transfers upon the death of the borrower; and 
(4) leases of the property for up to three years without options to purchase.9 
Section 341 (e) (1) of the Act authorized the FHLBB to issue 
rules and regulations governing the implementation of federal 
preemption. On April 26, 1983, the FHLBB issued new regula-
tions pursuant to this authority. Adopting its proposed regulations 
substantially as proposed, the FHLBB attempted to clarify several 
of the Act's provisions. One major clarification involved the issue 
of enforcement of due-on-sale clauses contained in various real 
estate devices. The FHLBB expanded the category of transfers 
subject to federal preemption, defining a "sale or transfer" for the 
purposes of a due-on-sale clause as "the conveyance of real prop-
erty of any right, title or interest therein, whether legal or equi-
table, whether voluntary or involuntary ... "and defining assump-
tions subject to the Act as transfers of real property subject to a 
real property loan by assumptions, installment land sales con-
tracts, wraparound loans, contracts for deed, transfers subject to 
the mortgage or similar lien, and other like transfers. 10 
The FHLBB also clarified the definition of a window-period 
loan and adopted a revised list of restrictions under state law that 
would create a window period. It defined a "window-period loan" 
as a "real property loan, not originated by a Federal association, 
which was made or assumed during a window period created by 
state law ... " and recorded before December 14, 1982. The 
window period would begin and terminate substantially as pro-
vided in the Act. 11 
i\ further provision stated that state lavvs or judicial decisions 
starting the window period would include laws or decisions permit-
ting the exercise of due-on-sale clauses only where the "lender's 
security interest or the likelihood of repayment is impaired" or 
where the lender is required to accept an assumption of the existing 
loan at existing or below-market interest rates. 12 Judicial decisions 
such as Wellenkamp v. Bank of America13 would therefore have the 
effect of creating a window period. Lenders may exercise due-on-
9. Act§ 341(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d) (1982). 
10. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(a)). 
11. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(p) (1)). 
12. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 591.2(p) (1)-
(3)). 
13. 21 Cal. 3d 943. 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1978). 
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sale clauses in window-period loans, under the new regulations, if 
the borrower's successor or transferee fails to meet the lender's 
credit standards or fails to provide information within fifteen days 
of a written request by the lender for credit information. 14 
The FHLBB also provided that its regulations would preempt all 
state limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses, including 
prohibitions on restraints on alienation, forfeitures and penalties, 
and other equitable restrictions. It retained, with one revision, 15 
the Act's specific limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses, 
limiting their application, however, to "any loan on the security of 
a home occupied or to be occupied by the borrower." It also stated 
that a lender may waive its option to exercise a due-on-sale clause 
if it agrees in writing with the borrower's successor before the 
transfer to obligate such successor under the terms of the loan and 
to accept interest payments from the successor at a rate requested 
by the lender. 16 
On July 14, 1983, the FHLBB modified one provision of its final 
regulations, in response to substantial comment. The FHLBB 
changed its temporary ban on the imposition of prepayment fees or 
penalties in connection with the exercise of a due-on-sale clause to 
a permanent ban on such fees or penalties. 11 The FHLBB autho-
rized a grace period for lenders who relied upon the initial regula-
tion and included and imposed prepayment penalties between 
May 13, 1983 and July 13, 1983. 
The Garn-St. Germain Act and the regulations promulgated by 
the FHLBB have completely preempted the inconsistent state and 
federal law with respect to due-on-sale clauses. The Act and reg-
ulations recognize the uniform enforceability of due-on-sale 
clauses for loans made by both state and federal financial institu-
14. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1983) (to be codified at C.F.R. § 591.4(d)). For the 
purpose of this requirement, the lender's credit standards are (1) the "customary 
credit standards applied by such lender," for lenders in the business of making 
real property loans, or (2) the "credit standards customarily applied by other 
similarly situated lenders or sellers in the geographic market within which the 
transaction occurs," for other lenders. 
15. The regulations retained the exemption from federal preemption for trans-
fers into inter vivos trusts in which the borrower is the beneficiary but provided 
that if, as a condition precedent to such transfer, "the borrower refuses to provide 
reasonable means acceptable to the lender by which the lender will be assured of 
timely notice of any subsequent transfer," the lender could exercise the due-on-
sale clause. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 591.5(b) (l)(vi)). 
16. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 591.5(b) (1), 
(b) (3)). 
17. 48 Fed. Reg. 32,160 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b) (2)). 
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tions, subject only to limitations contained therein. In this respect, 
the statutory provisions are more permissive than the case law 
which they replaced, and represent a greater adherence to a clear 
and uniform policy for all lenders. 
III. HUD Policies Regarding Transfers of 
Physical Assets 
One of the major developments affecting federal housing pro-
grams in the past year is HUD's establishment of new policies 
governing changes in the ownership of projects encumbered by 
mortgage loans insured or held by HUD. These ownership 
changes, which are known by HUD as transfers of physical assets 
(TP As), are prohibited under HUD's regulatory agreement unless 
HUD has given its prior written approval. By three memoranda to 
HUD field offices dated May 4, 1983, HUD has both clarified and 
established the standards and procedures which it will use in 
approving TP As and the sanctions which it will employ against 
participants in unauthorized TPAs. 18 
Generally, HUD has delegated a great deal of authority to HUD 
field offices to review and approve applications from the parties to 
a TPA. An extensive review procedure, known as "Full Review," 
is required for transfers involving a complete change of ownership 
of a project. Illustrative of such transfers are the follow-
ing: (1) transfers of title to the buyer from the mortgagor-seller; 
(2) conveyances by land contract; and (3) transfers of 100 percent 
of the partnership interest, corporate stock or beneficial interest (if 
a trustee of a passive trust is the mortgagor) of a mortgagor within a 
one-year period. 
The "Fuii Review" is a two-phase process, at each phase of 
which the applicant must provide HUD with specifically pre-
scribed documentation relating to such matters as the terms of the 
sale, the qualifications of the purchaser and the impact of the sale 
upon the project's financial condition. In the first phase of the 
review, this documentation is reviewed by the HUD field office, 
who will either preliminarily approve the TPA, reject it or seek a 
18. Copies of the memoranda maybe found in [2Ref. File] Hous. & DEV. REP. 
(BNA) 20:5001-5061 (July 11, 1983). 
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final decision from HUD headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
Where appropriate, HUD's review can be expedited by seeking 
the approval of HUD headquarters on isolated issues simul-
taneously with the review of a HUD field office. 
If an application is preliminarily approved, the second phase of 
the "Full Review" procedure begins. At this phase, the applicant is 
required to provide HUD with additional documentation includ-
ing documents such as executed, but unrecorded, sales contracts, 
secondary financing documents and deeds. The procedure pro-
vides for HUD to review these documents and then authorize their 
recordation. This is an unusual requirement which is inconsistent 
with the customary business practice of recording these kinds of 
documents immediately after they are executed. As of the date this 
article is being written, HUD has been made aware ofthis practical 
difficulty and is considering the problem. 
The "Full Review" procedure is required to be performed by 
HUD according to a detailed timetable. A specific number of 
working days has been prescribed for the completion of each step 
of the review. No such schedule has been prescribed for transac-
tions involving partial changes in ownership, which are subject to a 
less extensive review procedure known as a "Modified Review." 
These transactions include, but are not limited to, the follow-
ing: (1) the substitution of at least one of the general partners of 
the mortgagor; (2) transfers of less than 50 percent of a corporate 
mortgagor that result in changed control of the mortgagor; and 
(3) transfers of amounts in excess of 50 percent and less than 100 
percent of the partnership interests or corporate stock of a mort-
gagor within a one-year period. 
"Modified Review" is a procedure essentially identical to that 
set forth in a HUD memorandum of March 26, 1983, concerning 
TPAs. Under "Modified Review," a mortgagor must advise HUD 
in advance of the transaction and provide HUD with relevant 
documentation, which documentation is not nearly as detailed as 
in cases involving "Full Review." Another difference is that an 
application fee, which is required in connection with a "Full Re-
view," is not required in connection with a "Modified Review." 
All transactions, regardless of whether they are subject to "Full 
Review" or "Modified Review," are required to be evaluated 
substantively by HUD in accordance with several criteria known as 
Determinative Criteria. These criteria consist of the following: 
1. The proposed Owner/Managing General Partner is deter-
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mined to be qualified by the HUD field office from the 
standpoint of his financial net worth and experience. 
2. The proposed management agent is acceptable to the local 
HUD office. 
3. The project's physical needs are met by the proposed cash 
contribution. In order to recommend the proposed transfer, 
the HUD field office must determine that the project will be 
restored to sound physical condition within two years after 
the transfer, and that funds will be available to take care of 
the project's physical needs. Of course, this requirement 
applies only to projects having physical needs. 
4. The project's financial needs are met by the proposed cash 
contribution. If a project has financial needs, the HUD field 
office must determine that the mortgage will be brought 
current or that an acceptable work-out plan will be arranged, 
and that a project's replacement reserves will be adequately 
funded. 
5. HUD's outstanding regulations and administrative instruc-
tions are satisfied. This is a catch-all criterion designed to 
assure compliance with an assortment of requirements which 
have been promulgated by HUD in the form of handbooks, 
regulations and legal opinions. 
6. Where secondary financing is an element of the transfer, 
HUD's legal and administrative guidelines pertaining to 
secondary financing are satisfied. This criterion will be dis-
cussed in greater detail below. 
7. When conversion to condominium or cooperative ownership 
is an element of the transfer, the current HUD policy as 
regards condominium or cooperative conversion must be 
foiiowed. 
With regard to the sixth Determinative Criterion involving 
secondary financing, HUD defines secondary financing broadly as 
any portion of a project's price not paid in cash at the time of 
purchase. Accordingly, in HUD parlance, secondary financing 
includes such financing devices as land contract and deferred pay-
ment transactions, wraparound mortgages, second mortgages, un-
secured junior liens, loans secured by real property other than that 
being transferred, and loans secured by personalty or an escrowed 
deed of reconveyance. 
HUD has authorized HUD field officers to approve secondary 
financing in connection with TP As that satisfy a standard known as 
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 865 
the 75 percent/90 percent test. Under that test, the outstanding 
mortgage balance of the HUD-insured or HUD-held note, plus 
the face amount of the secondary indebtedness, plus the accrued 
but unpaid interest on the secondary indebtedness cannot exceed 
either (a) 75 percent of the replacement cost in the case of projects 
less than five years of age or older, or (b) 90 percent of the 
replacement cost in the case of projects less than five years of age. 
Where an otherwise acceptable TP A proposal fails to meet this 
test, the proposal will not be rejected automatically by HUD, but 
is to be forwarded to HUD headquarters for closer scrutiny. In 
short, the 75 percent/90 percent test is intended to serve as a device 
for screening out proposals which will be given a more extensive 
review by HUD. 
HUD's review procedure also requires HUD field offices to 
monitor every TPA for a period of at least three years in order to 
assure compliance with the terms and conditions of the transfer. 
Upon discovery of a deficient performance in connection with any 
TP A at any time during the monitoring of the project, the local 
HUD office is directed to take any appropriate action to restore 
the project to a sound condition. 
In addition to the foregoing review procedures and standards, 
HUD has also articulated the range of remedies which it will 
employ in connection with unauthorized TPAs. The remedies 
available to HUD may be divided broadly into two catego-
ries: (1) contractual remedies; and (2) administrative sanctions. 
In the first category, the contractual remedies available to HUD 
are based on paragraph 11 of the standard HUD Regulatory 
Agreement. This provision allows HUD, in the event of a breach 
of the regulatory agreement, to seek the appointment of a receiver 
to operate the property pending adjudication of HUD's claim 
against the original owner or purchaser, or to sue for civil damages 
or specific performance of the regulatory agreement, including 
reconveyance of the property to the original owner from the pur-
chaser. 
Administrative sanctions, the second category, are authorized 
by 24 C.F.R. Part 24. Such sanctions include the issuance by a 
HUD field office of a temporary or conditional denial of local 
participation in HUD programs by the original owner or mort-
gagor and the purchaser, and the issuance by HUD headquarters 
of suspension or debarment of any of these parties from participa-
tion nationwide in HUD programs. 
866 THE URBAN LA WYER VoL. 15, No. 4 
IV. Owner Participation in a Community Redevelopment 
Project: Agency Resolution of 
Conflicts between Neighbors 
FALL 1983 
This year, a California appellate court handed down a landmark 
decision, Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Duncan, 19 
which interpreted the important "owner participation" section of 
the California Community Redevelopment Law. 20 It will affect 
other states which have either patterned their redevelopment laws 
after California's or adopted similar owner participation sections 
in their redevelopment laws. 
When California adopted its redevelopment law in 1951, pur-
suant to a voter-approved amendment to the State Constitution, 
the right of "owner participation" in community redevelopment 
projects was included in the new law. The current provision for 
owner participation states: 
Every redevelopment plan shall provide for participation in the redevelopment 
of property in the project area by the owners of all or part of such property if the 
owners agree to participate in the redevelopment in conformity with the 
redevelopment plan adopted by the legislative body for the area. (Emphasis 
added.)21 
This protective provision was an attempt to silence the protests of 
those who felt that private property would be taken under the new 
law by community redevelopment agencies using the power of 
eminent domain to arbitrarily confer property upon favored pri-
vate developers. 22 
In 1964, the California Supreme Court, construing the owner 
participation provision, held that the provision does not grant a 
property owner an absolute right to participate in a redevelopment 
project. 23 The court stated that since section 33701 of the Commu-
19. 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1983). 
20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE §§ 33000-33985 (Deering 1982). 
21. Id. § 33339. 
22. A qualified community redevelopment agency is authorized to file an 
eminent domain action, under California law, if a valid Resolution of Necessity is 
passed which finds that 
(a) The public interest and necessity require the project. 
(b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compati-
ble with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
(c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project. 
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.030, .040 (Deering 1982). 
23. In re Development Plan for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 389 P.2d 538, 37 
Cal. Rptr. 74, cert. denied, Babcock v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 379 
U.S. 899, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, Trautwein v. Community Redevelop-
ment Agency, 379 U.S. 28 (1964). 
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nity Redevelopment Law (now section 33339)24 provides that, as a 
condition to owner participation, the owner "must agree to partici-
pate in the redevelopment in conformity with the redevelopment 
plan adopted by the legislative body for the area,"25 the owner's 
participation right is not absolute. 
The Bunker Hill holding ratified the distinction between two 
classes of "developers" in a redevelopment project. Established 
developers who agree to rehabilitate an entire block in conform-
ance with the redevelopment plan if the agency involved will turn 
over the land to them without interference have, under Bunker 
Hill, a tactical advantage over the individual parcel owner who 
wants to rebuild his property but may be unwilling to conform with 
the plan. If the individual parcel owner is willing and able to 
rebuild the entire block, he may legally do so and may even have a 
"leg up" on the deal because of his ownership of the one parcel; 
however, as a practical matter, the individual owner is typically 
foreclosed from development of an entire block. 
A third class of potential developer is the property owner who 
wants to expand the use of his present site or even relocate his 
operations within the project boundaries. This person may own 
more than one individual parcel, but, through lack of inclination or 
resources, may not wish to rehabilitate an entire block. His desire 
for expansion will necessarily conflict with his neighbor's desire to 
remain in place or even expand on his own. Therefore, two owners 
acting in good faith with the same vested statutory rights may come 
into direct conflict. 
The California Second District Court of Appeal held in Hunting-
ton Park26 that a redevelopment agency may resolve such conflicts 
by taking the property of one landowner, notwithstanding the 
owner's right to participate in the project. In Huntington Park, 
defendant Duncans owned a piece of industrial property located 
with the Huntington Park Industrial Redevelopment Project 
(HPIRA), where they operated a business on a portion thereof 
and rented out the rest as a parking lot. The Duncans' neighbors, 
the Spitzers, desired to expand their business onto the portion of 
the Duncan property used as a parking lot, and submitted a pro-
posal to the city's Redevelopment Agency for this purpose in 
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 33339 (Deering 1982). 
25. Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d at 59-60, 389 P.2d at 563, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 99. 
26. 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1983). 
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August, 1979. The agency notified the Duncans of the Spitzers' 
intentions. 
In September, the Duncans countered with a proposal to im-
prove the parking lot with a machine shop. The Duncans, the 
Spitzers, their attorneys, the agency board and staff, and all the 
attendant experts, reporters, and interested citizens came together 
at a public meeting in October, at which the Spitzers proposed to 
erect an industrial building with a market value of $108,000, to be 
operating within one year. The Duncans valued their proposed 
improvements at $87 ,628, but would not commit themselves to a 
completion date. The agency board designated an expert consul-
tant to study both proposals and report to the next board meeting. 
At that time, the consultant reported that the Spitzer proposal 
would provide more new jobs (thirty-four vs. eight), more tax 
revenue (an added $1,080/year vs. $880/year), and more sales ($2 
million vs. an undetermined figure) than the Duncan proposal. 
The consultant also determined that the Duncans' proposed shop 
could be accommodated on remaining Duncan property not 
sought by the Spitzers. 
The Duncans refused the agency's purchase offer and resisted 
the subsequent condemnation action, contending that the agency 
abused its discretion in granting the Spitzer proposal and denying 
theirs. The trial court held for the Duncans, stating that the prop-
erty in question was not necessary for the HPIRA except as to the 
improvements proposed by the Duncans pursuant to their owner 
participation rights, and therefore that the agency had abused its 
discretion. 
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, 
holding: 
Defendants' [Duncans'] status as owners desiring participation in the project 
did not preclude the Agency from exercising its discretion to take defendants' 
property, [since] an owner of a particular parcel does not have an absolute right 
to develop that parcel. 27 
The court, after citing Pellom v. Redevelopment Agency28 for the 
proposition that the agency has a duty of reasonableness and good 
faith in exercising its eminent domain powers, and is required to 
act fairly and without discrimination, concluded that: 
No special status is accorded owners of particular parcels. The Spitzers and the 
Duncans have equal preference status under this provision. 
27. Huntington Park, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 749. 
28. 157 Cal. App. 2d 243, 320 P.2d 884 (1958). 
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The Agency did not violate its duty of reasonableness and good faith by 
selecting the proposal of a competing owner participant, over the Duncans, 
especially in view of the significant advantages of the Spitzers' proposal. 29 
The California Supreme Court denied the Duncans' petition for 
hearing, thereby sanctioning the holding of the Second District 
Court of Appeal. 
Huntington Park reaffirms the Bunker Hill holding that the 
owner participation right is not absolute, but is subject to the 
owner's agreement to conform with the redevelopment plan. The 
case goes beyond this reaffirmance, however, to hold that a rede-
velopment agency may preempt an owner's participation right, 
e.g., in selecting the development proposal of a competing owner 
participant, in cases of conflict. This represents a major expansion 
of the eminent domain powers of redevelopment agencies, and a 
parallel contraction of the "protective" nature of the owner par-
ticipation provision. 
V. The Status of the Governmental 
Leasing Act of 1983 
Legislation was recently introduced by Congressman Jake Pickle, 
the so-called Pickle II Bill,30 which provides, in effect, that de-
velopers would have to choose between tax-exempt financing and 
investment tax credits. The legislation is aimed principally at sale-
leasebacks to governmental or tax-exempt entities. 31 However, as 
introduced, section l(c), which restricts the availability of the 
rehabilitation credit when tax-exempt financing is used to acquire 
or rehabilitate property, applies to all rehabilitation projects. A 
fair interpretation of the legislation could require that the reha-
bilitation credit be made unavailable only when tax-exempt financ-
ing was utilized to acquire or rehabilitate property which would be 
used by a tax-exempt or governmental entity. 
In response to a concentrated effort by members of the National 
Housing Rehabilitation Association and others32 to eliminate this 
ambiguity in the Pickle II Bill, Chairman Rostenkowski of the 
29. Huntington Park, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 26, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 750. 
30. Government Leasing Act of 1983, H.R. 3110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 
CONG. REC. E2513-14 (extension of remarks May 24, 1983). 
31. 129 CONG. REC. E2512-13 (extension of remarks May 24, 1983) (statement 
of Rep. Pickle). 
32. See M. Ainslee, Impact of the Proposed Government Leasing Act on 
Historic Properties, 15 URB. LAW. vi (Summer 1983). 
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House Ways and Means Committee has agreed to offer, at an 
appropriate time, an amendment clarifying the scope of section 
l(c).33 
Similar legislation has been introduced in the Senate by Senators 
Dole, Metzenbaum and Durenberger. Although this legislation is 
in some respects harsher than the House bill, it does not contain 
the restrictive language that concerned the NHRA in the House 
bill. 34 
33. Letter from John J. Salmon, Chief Counsel, Committee on Ways and 
Means, to Sheldon L. Schreiberg (June 10, 1983) (discussing the scope of section 
l(c) of RR. 3110). 
34. The Governmental Lease Financing Reform Act of 1983, S. 1564, 98th 
Cong. 1st Sess. (1983). Very briefly, the Senate language provides that: 
In the case of fifteen-year real property occupied by a tax-exempt user, the 
depreciation period would be extended to at least forty years and the rehabilita-
tion tax credit would not be available for expenditures allocable to tax-exempt 
use property. 'Tax-exempt use property' is defined as any fifteen-year real 
property where one of the following four conditions exists: 
(1) tax-exempt industrial development bond financing under l.R.C. 
§ 103(b) is utilized and the tax-exempt entity to occupy the premises partici-
pated in the financing; or, 
(2) the lease with the tax-exempt user provides a fixed price purchase or sale 
option; or 
(3) use by the tax-exempt entity occurs after a sale or lease of the property by 
that entity and a subsequent leaseback; or 
(4) more than 50 percent of the property is occupied by a 'tax-exempt user' 
under a lease with a term greater than ten years including renewals. 
